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Abstract 
In this paper, using pseudo panel data we analyze the relation between cigarette and alcoholic beverage 
consumption within the rational addiction framework. We believe that pseudo panel data approach has 
many advantages compared to aggregate and panel data models. We found that alcoholic beverages are 
complements for cigarettes, while it is not the same the other way around. Moreover, we found that 
alcohol is a gateway for cigarette which further supports our conclusion concerning the reinforcing effect 
of  alcohol  consumption  on  cigarette  consumption.  We  believe  that  drinking  works  as  a  trigger  for 
smoking especially in social settings like bars while it is also possible (although less likely) that  people 
who want to cut cigarette consumption  might  increase alcohol consumption  to cope with resulting 
stress,  which  induces  an  asymmetry  in  cross  price  elasticities.  However  we  point  out  that  the 
complementarity relationship is much stronger and significant. Policy implications for the results are 
explained and the direction for further research is addressed. 
 










1.  Introduction 
The adverse health effects of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages have long been recognized. There 
are also negative externalities associated with the consumption of these two particular goods. The adverse 
health effects of passive smoking and the fatalities resulting from drunk driving have made these two 
goods the prime targets of excise taxation in many countries. 
With the harmful addictive substances, the benefit comes now, in the form of the pleasure, and 
the cost, in terms of damage to the individual’s health, comes later. Then, one can argue that people who 
consume harmful addictive substances are likely to discount the future more compared to other people. If 
being a smoker is, in part, a matter of discounting the future more heavily, smokers should display more 
present-oriented behavior in a whole range of activities and are more likely to drink compared to other 
people. If cigarette and alcohol are related in consumption, the information on the way in which they are 
related may allow a better coordination of the public policies concerning these goods.  
When modeling the demand for addictive (habit-forming) goods like cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages, one of the most popular frameworks is the rational addiction model proposed by Becker and 
Murphy (1988). Becker and Murphy (1988) claim that addictions to harmful substances are still rational 
as the decision involve forward-looking maximization of utility. In their theory of rational addiction, 
"rational" means that individuals maximize utility over time, and a good is addictive (habit forming) if 
increases in past consumption increase current consumption. The rational addiction model differs from 
the myopic models of addictive behavior in the sense that it does not only account for habit formation, but 
it also involves rationality. In myopic models, past consumption stimulates current consumption, but 
individuals ignore the future when making consumption decisions. In the rational addiction model, the 
past and anticipated future consumption both affect current consumption positively. 
The rational addiction model has been previously applied to both cigarette consumption (e.g. 
Chaloupka, 1991; Becker et al., 1994; Jones and Labeaga, 2003) and alcohol consumption (e.g. Grossman 
et al, 1998; Waters and Sloan, 1995).  Bask and Melkersson (2004) extended the rational addiction model 
to  allow  for  multi-commodity  addictions  and  estimated  the  demand  for  cigarettes  and  alcohol  using 4 
aggregate time series data. However, to the best of our knowledge, nobody has used individual/household 
level data to analyze the relation between cigarette and alcohol consumptions in a rational addiction 
framework. 
Aggregate data fail to provide detailed insights into individual behavior. On the other hand, while 
panel surveys can be used to model the dynamics of individual behavior, they generally span short time 
periods and are subject to attrition bias. Thus we employ a pseudo panel data approach in this study. 
While the pseudo panel is disaggregated enough, it has main advantages compared with panel data: 
  It avoids the attrition problem that many panel surveys suffer from.  
  There may be less bias due to measurement error problems as we are typically working with a 
group average. 
  It eliminates the econometric difficulties due to censoring. 
       Using 2002-2008 Consumer Expenditure Diary Survey Data by Bureau of Labor Statistics, we 
construct a pseudo panel data that follows a cohort for 28 quarters. Then at the cohort level, we estimate 
dynamic demand models for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. 
      The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the rational addiction model 
and the theoretical framework for two addictive consumption goods. Section 3 gives a discussion of the 
data set used. Section 4 explains the pseudo panel approach. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 explains 
policy implications. Section 7 concludes the study, and discusses the direction for future research on the 
issue. 
 
2.  Theoretical Model 
A consumer is said to be addicted to a consumption good, if an increase in past consumption 
increases  current  consumption.  Studies  of  harmful  addictions  have  usually  found  reinforcement  and 
tolerance. Tolerance means that the satisfaction from a given consumption level of a good is lower when 
past  consumption  is  higher.  Reinforcement,  on  the  other  hand,  means  that  an  increase  in  the  past 5 
consumption increases the craving for current consumption. Reinforcement implies that consumption of 
the same good at different time periods are complements.  Since rational consumers also consider the 
future negative consequences of harmful behavior, the reinforcement effect should be high enough in 
order to justify current consumption of harmful addictive goods. 
     Following Bask and Melkersson (2004), we assume: 
                                                                                                                                                        (1) 
where        and     are the quantities of cigarettes and alcohol consumed by consumer i in period t;  
                  and     are the habit stocks of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages in period t respectively; 
                  is the consumption of a non-addictive composite commodity in period t. 
We assume a strictly concave utility function. The marginal utility derived from each good is 
assumed to be positive ( i.e.,       ,        and       ; concavity implies        ,         and 
       ). Following rational addiction literature, we assume that habit stocks of harmful substances 
affect current utility negatively due to their adverse health effects ( i.e.   <0 and        ; concavity 
implies         and         ).  
Reinforcement implies         and        . Smoking and drinking are assumed to have no 
effect on the marginal utility derived from the consumption of the composite commodity ( i.e.      
                     ). 
If the two addictive goods are substitutes,    < 0 ; if they are complements          When the 
cigarette consumption does not depend on the level of alcohol consumption        . 
The intertemporal budget constraint is 
       
 
   
                                                                                                                        
where               with r being the discount rate,     and      are prices of cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages respectively,    is the present value of wealth. As in previous studies, we assume that the 
discount rate is equal to the interest rate.  The composite commodity, N, is taken as numeraire. 6 
The consumer’s problem is: 
                              
 
   
                                                                                                             
                                
 
   
                                                                                               
Following  previous  studies,  we  assume  that               and               .  When  the 
instantaneous utility function is quadratic, solving equation (3) generates the following demand equations: 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                
    Economic theory implies         with k =1, 2. Rational addiction implies                 with 
k=1,2.          if cigarettes and alcoholic beverages are complements,          if they are substitutes, and 
         if consumption of cigarette and alcoholic beverages do not depend on each other. If           
alcohol  consumption  is  a  gateway  for  cigarette  consumption,  if           cigarette  consumption  is  a 
gateway for alcohol consumption.
1 
 
3.  Data 
      The main data source is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) which is conducted by U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
3.1.  Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX):  Diary Component 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In 
the academic literature, CEX data have been used to study a variety of issues from life-cycle hypothesis to 
                                                           
1 Pacula (1997) investigates the so called “gateway effect”: consumption of a legal addictive substance may lead to 
the later use of an illicit addictive substance. As pointed by Pierani and Tiezzi (2009) the same effect can be thought 
to apply between cigarette and alcohol. 7 
consumer demand (e.g. Nicol, 2003; Villaverde and Krueger, 2007). The CEX consists of a Diary survey 
and an Interview survey. Diary component is used in this study. The Diary component is completed by 
the consumer units (CUs) for two consecutive one-week periods.  The survey is designed to constitute a 
representative  sample  of  the  U.S.  population  in  each  quarter.  The  data  contains  information  on  CU 
demographic characteristics and expenditures. The list and the definitions of the demographic variables 
used in this study are given in Appendix A. The alcoholic beverage and tobacco expenditures, together 
with price variables, are used to calculate the consumption levels of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes 
(i.e. cigarette consumption= cigarette expenditure/ cigarette price). 
3.2.  Price Variables 
Since  price  data  are  not  collected  in  the  CEX,  the  price  variables  used  in  our  analysis  are 
constructed from other data sources. All price variables are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
for all items reported in BLS webpage. We merge CEX data and price data by state id variables. 
The annual state level cigarette prices are from Orzechowski and Walker (2007). The prices are 
weighted averages for a pack of 20 cigarettes. The prices are inclusive of state-level excise taxes applied 
to cigarettes but are exclusive of local cigarette taxes. To add monthly variation to annual prices we use 
“monthly CPI for cigarettes” reported in BLS webpage. For each CU, we weight annual prices by the 
average CPI of the quarter in which the cigarette expenditure is reported.  
We don’t have state level or household level prices available for alcoholic beverages. To obtain 
alcoholic beverages prices, we construct Lewbel(1989) price indices that enable us to have household 
specific price variation. 
2 Lewbel price indices are calculated using expenditure shares each household 
faces for different subcategories of alcoholic beverages, i.e. beer at home, wine at restaurant, etc (for 
details see Appendix B).  
                                                           
2 Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008) show that Lewbel price indices produce superior empirical results compared to 
the results  obtained using traditional aggregate price indices. 8 
3.3.  Sample Selection Criteria 
In CEX data, Census Bureau suppresses the value of the variable, STATE, which identifies the 
state of residence, for some observations to meet the Census Disclosure Review Board’s criterion that the 
smallest geographically identifiable area have a population of at least 100,000. On approximately 17 
percent of the records on the FMLY files the STATE variable is blank and approximately 4 percent of 
STATE codes are replaced with codes of states other than the state where the CU resides. Because we use 
STATE information to match CU’s with state level cigarette prices, the observations with missing and 
recoded STATE variables are dropped.  
 
4.  Methodology 
The advantages of using panel data to estimate models of individual behavior have been widely 
stressed in the literature. However, individual panel data generally span short time periods, suffer from 
measurement error and are subject to attrition bias. In order to avoid these problems, Deaton (1985) 
suggested pseudo panel data approach as an alternative way to estimate models of individual behavior.  
The  pseudo-panel  approach  is  a  relatively  new  econometric  method  for  estimating  dynamic 
demand models. It is based on grouping individuals into cohorts and then treating cohort averages as 
observations  in  a  panel.  It  enables  us  to  follow  cohorts  of  individuals  over  repeated  cross-sectional 
surveys. Because repeated cross-sectional surveys are typically over longer time-periods than true panels, 
pseudo panel allows us to estimate models over longer time periods. Moreover, averaging within cohorts 
eliminates individual-level measurement error. 
In pseudo-panel analysis, because cohorts are followed over time, they are constructed based on 
characteristics that are time invariant, such as geographic region, birth year or the education level of the 
reference person. When we allocate individuals into cohorts, we face a trade-off between the number of 
cohorts and the number of individuals within cohorts. If individuals are allocated to a large number of 
cohorts, there will be a few observations remained in the cohorts which might induce biased estimators. 9 
On the other hand, if a few number of cohorts is chosen to have a large number of observations per 
cohort, individuals within a cohort might be heterogeneous, which might cause inefficiency. Thus, the 
challenge in constructing a pseudo panel is to find the optimal choice between the numbers of cohorts, 
and  the  number  of  individuals  within  cohorts.  Ideally  the  optimal  choice  should  minimize  the 
heterogeneity within each cohort but maximize the heterogeneity among them. In that case, pseudo-panels 
lead to consistent and efficient estimators without the problems associated with true panels.  
In most of the applied pseudo-panel studies, the sample is divided into small number of cohorts 
with a large number of observations in each (i.e. Browning et al., 1985; Blundell et al., 1994; Propper et 
al.,2001). Verbeek and Nijman (1992) showed that when cohorts contain at least 100 individuals and the 
time variation in the cohort means is sufficiently large, the bias in the standard fixed effects estimator will 
be small and can be ignored. This is the approach we take in this study. 
We allocate households into cohorts based on geographic region (northeast, east, west, south) and 
gender. For example, females in northeast would form one cohort and males in northeast would form 
another cohort. The resulting pseudo panel consists of a total of 224 observations over 8 cohorts (4 
regions times 2 gender) and 28 quarters (from the first quarter of 2002 to the last quarter of 2008). This 
allocation results in an average cohort size of about 100 individuals.  
Taking cohort averages of equations (3) and (4) over the    individuals observed in cohort c at 
time t results in: 
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                    
With repeated cross-sections, different individuals are observed at each time period. As a result, 
the  lagged  and  lead  variables  are  not  observed  for  the  individuals  in  cohort  c  at  time  t.  Therefore 10 
following previous literature, we replace these sample means of the unobserved variables with the sample 
means of the individuals at time t−1, and t+1 respectively leading to the following equations: 
                                                                                                         
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                            
Because different individuals are observed in each cohort, endogeneous right hand side variables 
problem does not exist in dynamic pseudo-panel data models. In the dynamic pseudo-panel data model, 
the fixed effects estimator is consistent when        (McKenzie, 2004).  In our sample the number of 
observations in each cohort is large. Thus fixed effects estimators are calculated. 
In the sample, the numbers of households in each cohort/time period are not the same, which 
might cause heteroskedasticity. To correct for that, following Dargay (2007), all cohort variables are 
weighted by the square root of the number of households in each cohort.  
 
5.  Results 
We have carried out different sets of estimations. First, the model in equations (7) and (8) is 
estimated  as  two  separate  structural  equations.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  1
3.  In the cigarette 
equation, current consumption is positively affected by lagged and lead consumption. The coefficient on 
lagged consumption is higher than the lead consumption coefficient which means the rate of intertemporal 
preference is positive. Thus cigarette demand is consistent with rational addiction. Cigarette demand is 
negatively affected by its own price which is consistent with the economic theory. Current cigarette 
equation is positively affected by current  alcoholic beverage  consumption which  means alcohol is a 
complement  for  cigarette.  Moreover,  alcohol   consumption  seems  to  be  a  gate way  to  cigarette 
consumption because lagged alcohol consumption is positive and significant.  
                                                           
3 The coefficients on demographics is not discussed as it is not our main concern in this study. 11 
In the alcohol demand equation, both lagged and lead consumption have a negative coefficient 
which seems to contradict rational addiction. This result might be due to possible inventory effects for 
alcoholic beverages as we use expenditure data instead of consumption data. The coefficient on current 
own price is negative and significant. Current cigarette consumption has a positive sign which supports 
the complementary relationship between cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. 
The long run price and income elasticities calculated at the sample mean are shown in Table 2. 
The long run own price  elasticities are negative for both goods. Cigarette demand is inelastic while 
alcohol demand is elastic and highly significant. This is not surprising as cigarette is more addictive than 
alcohol and it is likely that most alcoholic beverage drinkers are just social drinkers. Income elasticity is 
positive and less than one for both goods. 
Next we have imposed a discount rate of r =0.05 in both equations. The signs and magnitudes of 
the main coefficients of the restricted model are pretty similar to those of unrestricted model. After the 
restriction, the significance of the coefficients in cigarette demand equation improved while in alcohol 
demand equation the negative coefficients on lagged and lead consumption is now insignificant. After the 
imposed restriction the long-run elasticity estimates did not change much either (see Table 2).  
Finally,  equations  (7)  and  (8)  are  combined  to  estimate  a  semi-reduced  system 
(Bask&Melkersson(2004) and Pierani&Tiezzi (2009) point out that smoking and drinking is often done at 
the same time, thus consumption of cigarettes and alcohol should be estimated simultaneously):  
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                    
The parameters in these equations are non-linear functions of the parameters in Equations (7) and 
(8), thus we don’t have prior expectations for their signs. Instead, we should focus on the resulting long-
run demand elasticities. 12 
The results  for  own  price  elasticities  and income  elasticities  are  similar  to  the  ones that  we 
obtained using two separate equations (see Table 2). The cross price elasticity of cigarette with respect to 
alcohol  price  is  negative  and  significant,  while  the  cross  price  elasticity  of  alcohol  with  respect  to 
cigarette price is positive, small in magnitude and insignificant. This suggests that smokers respond to 
alcohol prices while drinkers do not respond much (or at all) to cigarette prices. The intuition for that is an 
important number of smokers are just social smokers who smoke when they drink and socialize. Thus a 
change  in  alcohol  prices  is  likely  to  influence  their  alcohol  consumption  and  thus  their  cigarette 
consumption as cigarettes and alcohol are complements for them. In addition we found that alcohol is a 
gateway  for  cigarette  which  further  reinforces  our  conclusion  concerning  the  effect  of  alcohol 
consumption on cigarette consumption. 
Decker and Schwartz (2000) found similar cross price elasticities in an analysis of smoking and 
drinking participation; i.e. cross price elasticity is negative for cigarette demand while it is positive for 
alcohol  demand.  They  view  this  as  potential  evidence  of  different  behavioral  processes  determining 
smoking and drinking behavior: 
 “While  investigating  the  underlying  behavioral  processes  determining 
drinking  and  smoking  decisions  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper,  the 
measured elasticities are consistent with the following scenario. Increases in 
beer prices lead some to stop drinking (say, to not go to a bar after work) 
and as the "situational cue" for social smoking is eliminated, their smoking 
participation  also  declines.  The  effect  of  cigarette  price  on  drinking 
participation follows a different scenario. Increases in cigarette prices lead 
some  to  quit  smoking,  inducing  greater  stress  among  the  now-former 
smokers who turn to alcohol consumption for its palliative effects.” (Decker 
and Schwartz, 2000, p.16) 
We agree with the view that cigarettes and alcohol are complements especially in social settings 
like bars, etc. while they might be substitutes in certain cases where the individual sees both cigarettes 13 
and alcohol as stress reducers. On the one hand, drinking works as a trigger for smoking in bars or any 
social  settings;  on  the  other  hand,  people  who  cut  cigarette  consumption  might  increase  alcohol 
consumption  to  alleviate  resulting  stress,  which  induces  an  asymmetry  in  cross  price  elasticities. 
However, we believe that the substitutability relationship is pretty weak compared to the complementarity 
relation (i.e., positive cross price elasticity for alcohol demand is small in magnitude and insignificant, 
whereas negative cross price elasticity in cigarette demand is larger in magnitude and significant). We 
believe that this is why majority of papers in the literature  find a complementarity relation between 
cigarettes and alcohol. 
 
6.  Policy Implications 
As we stated in the introduction, cigarette and alcohol consumption not only have negative effects 
on health but they also impose negative externalities on third parties. Our findings suggest important 
policy implications for the appropriate design of cigarette and alcohol taxes. Because alcoholic beverages 
are  complements  for  cigarettes,  by  raising  the  price  of  only  alcoholic  beverages,  a  reduction  in  the 
demand of both goods could be achieved (cross price elasticity of cigarettes with respect to alcohol price 
is negative and significant). However considering the magnitude of own-price elasticity for alcoholic 
beverages, policy makers face a trade-off between reducing the consumption of these harmful goods and 
maximizing tax revenues (i.e., demand for alcohol is elastic and significant).  Taxing alcohol which has 
an elastic demand puts the burden of the tax on producers. There is no easy solution to the problem. 
Although cigarette taxation has been cited as one of the most effective public health tools for 
cigarette control, our results suggest that increasing cigarette prices might increase alcohol consumption. 
A possible suggestion is using policy tools other than taxation to reduce the consumption of these 
harmful goods. There have been many attempts to reduce cigarette consumption in recent years (i.e. 
smoking bans in public places). Because cigarettes and alcohol are believed to be complements in social 
settings, these types of policies might be more effective in achieving desired outcomes. 
 14 
7.  Conclusion 
It has long been recognized that cigarette and alcohol not only have adverse health effects, but 
also negative externalities imposed on third parties. For that reason these two goods became the prime 
targets of excise taxation in many countries. 
One can argue that people who consume harmful addictive substances like cigarettes and alcohol 
are likely to discount the future more compared to other people. Thus, if being a smoker is, in part, a 
matter of discounting the future more heavily, smokers should display more present-oriented behavior in 
a whole range of activities and are more likely to drink compared to other people. If cigarettes and 
alcoholic beverages are related in consumption, the information about how they are related may permit 
better coordination of public policies (e.g.,excise taxation) concerning these goods. 
  In this  study, we analyze the relation between cigarette and alcoholic beverage consumption 
within the rational addiction framework. We use pseudo panel data approach which has many advantages 
compared to aggregate and panel data models. We found that alcohol is a complement for cigarette, and 
smokers respond to rising alcohol prices, while it is not the same the other way around. In addition we 
found that alcohol is a gateway for cigarette. We believe that drinking works as a trigger for smoking 
especially in social setting like bars, etc. On the other hand, it is also possible (although less likely) that 
individuals  who  want  to  cut  cigarette  consumption  might  increase  alcohol  consumption  to  relieve 
resulting  stress.  This  scenario  is  consistent  with  the  observed  asymmetry  in  cross  price  elasticities. 
However as we point out the complementarity relationship is stronger and significant. 
Because alcoholic beverages are complements for cigarettes, increasing only alcoholic beverages 
prices would decrease the demand for both goods. However considering that alcohol demand is pretty 
elastic, policy makers face a trade-off between reducing the consumption of these harmful goods and 
maximizing tax revenues.  Moreover, although cigarette taxation has been cited as an effective public 
policy tool for cigarette control, our results suggest that increasing cigarette prices might lead to increased 
alcohol consumption. 15 
A possible resolution of this conflict is to use other policy tools to reduce the consumption of 
these addictive goods. There have been many public policy attempts which aimed reducing cigarette 
consumption in recent years (i.e., smoking bans in public places). As we believe that cigarettes and 
alcohol are complements in social settings, policies such as smoking bans in bars,etc might be more 
effective in achieving the desired outcomes. New insights can be gained by analyzing the effects of these 
















Table 1:Estimates of Cigarette and Alcohol Demand (p values in parantheses) 
   
Separate (unrestricted)  Separate ( r =0.05)  Semi-reduced systm 
Cigarettes 
                  Constant 
 
-92.9140  (0.0003) 
 






0.1159  (0.0924) 
 






0.0845  (0.2206) 
 






0.0172  (0.0756) 
 






0.0112  (0.2796) 
 
0.0109  (0.2882) 
 
- 
  At+1 
 
-0.0002  (0.9876) 
 






-3.8422  (0.2664) 
 







   
- 





-0.0065  (0.6680) 
 






-2.6390  (0.4436) 
 






3.8918  (0.0566) 
 






-4.8239  (0.0664) 
 






0.0463  (0.6613) 
 






4.2871  (0.2652) 
 






0.9276  (0.8633) 
 






10.4535  (0.1527) 
 






4.2182  (0.4576) 
 






8.1041  (0.4856) 
 






2.6805  ( 0.4328) 
 








   
0.6725 
   
0.6744 
  Alcohol 
                  Constant 
 
136.7090  (0.3981) 
 






-0.0057  (0.9295) 
 






-0.1110  (0.0665) 
 






-0.2345  (0.5914) 
 






0.2464  ( 0.6075) 
 
0.3072  (0.5206) 
 
- 
  Ct+1 
 
0.2210  (0.6179) 
 






-158.0080  (<.0001) 
 







   
- 





0.4345  (<.0001) 
 






-9.5653  (0.6637) 
 






1.7516  (0.8920) 
 






21.0883  (0.2147) 
 






2.4747  (0.0002) 
 






93.6313  (0.0001) 
 






-90.0636  (0.0081) 
 






-85.7959  (0.0695) 
 






-52.7177  (0.1489) 
 






-75.3618  (0.3205) 
 






-30.9519  (0.1581) 
 







   
0.6824 

























Table 2: Long-run price and income elasticities (p values in parantheses) 
   
Separate (unrestricted) 
 





-0.6815  (0.2510) 
 
-0.6869  (0.2474) 
 
-0.5195  (0.3916) 
εAA 
 
-1.7167  (<.0001) 
 
-1.6628  (<.0001) 
 




   
- 
   




   
- 
   
0.0154  (0.9677) 
εCY 
 
0.0381  (0.7360) 
 
0.0389  (0.7307) 
 
0.0386  (0.7265) 
εAY 
 
0.3489  (<.0001) 
 
0.3556  (<.0001) 
 
0.3502  (<.0001) 
 
Appendix A: List of demographics variables used 
     
Variable  Variable Definitions 
AGE  age of the reference person 
MARRIED  1 if the reference person is married 
WIDOWED  1 if the reference person is widowed 
DIVORCED  1 if the reference person is divorced 
SEPERATED  1 if the reference person is seperated 
COLLEGE  1 if the reference person has a bachelor's or a higher degree 
FAM_SIZE  number of members in CU 
PERSLT18  number of children less than 18 in CU 
HOMEOWNER 1 if CU owns house 18 
Appendix B: Calculation of Lewbel price indices for alcoholic beverages 
Lewbel price indices allow heterogeneity in preferences for goods within a given bundle of goods. Cobb 
Douglas within bundle preferences are assumed, while between bundles any specification is allowed. 
Following Lewbel (1989) and Hoderlein and Mihaleva(2008), we construct Lewbel price indices as: 
                   
 
  
   
   
   
 
      
     
where       is  the  budget  share  of  good j in  group  i  of  the  household, and         is  the  price  index.                                     
                 is  a  scaling  factor  with              
         
      and            is  the  budget  share  of  the  reference  
household. 
In our sample there are many zero expenditures reported for subcategories of alcoholic beverages. 
To deal with that first we took the log, then the exponential of Lewbel price index referring to the fact that 
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